Unverified50% confidenceFactExact time
An attacker can, by carefully arranging thread scheduling and system call timing, create a window between the permission check and the use of the resource, so that after the kernel 'passes the check' but before it uses the resource, the resource has already been replaced or freed. Such vulnerabilities are difficult to find through static code review and cannot be reliably reproduced by conventional fuzzing.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/15/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
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