Unverified50% confidenceOpinionExact time
The author suggests writing the system prompt as content that will be publicly released, because part of it is bound to be read; this does not mean abandoning defensive instructions, but rather not relying on them to bear security responsibilities.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/16/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
UnverifiedThe core principle of defending against prompt injection is to always treat document content as data rather than instructions; the application's security policy should not be overridden by any text in the document.72% similarUnverifiedThe recommended pragmatic approach is to place security and release baselines in shared convention files, while explicitly importing critical rules in CLAUDE.md.71% similarUnverifiedThe author deliberately maintains a privacy boundary by not inspecting prompts, source code, or any application content, relying solely on system-level signals.69% similarUnverifiedApproval records should remain in the hands of reviewers, stored in pull requests or protected files that the model cannot edit.67% similarUnverifiedWhen instructions such as not mentioning the report to the user are written into the code, it essentially deprives users at the system level of the opportunity to make an informed judgment, deviating from the principle of informed consent.66% similar
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