Unverified50% confidenceFactExact time
In an agent chain with shared credentials, an agent subjected to prompt injection still holds the credentials for the entire chain, so it can legitimately call downstream agents and read sensitive resources, multiplying the attack surface.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/29/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
UnverifiedIn multi-agent systems, if all sub-agents share the same set of tools and access credentials, once a sub-agent is manipulated by a prompt injection attack, the attack surface extends to the entire system.77% similarUnverifiedIf the delegation chain is poorly designed, an attacker who controls one link in the chain can laterally expand access boundaries under the cover of a legitimate token—this is a new variant of the confused deputy attack in Agent scenarios.74% similarUnverifiedIn proxy scenarios, handing the parsing step over to the proxy is essentially trading "trust in the proxy-side parsing environment" for "connection reachability", and since the proxy usually performs its own caching and validation, the rebinding risk is not entirely abandoned.74% similarUnverifiedIn a multi-Agent collaboration chain, delegation allows permissions to pass along the chain; for example, Agent A delegates to Agent B to call a tool, and B effectively inherits part of A's permissions.74% similarUnverifiedMulti-source Agent plugins introduce permission and trust issues; a third-party extension that can read bookmarks and write feed preferences holds a personalized profile of technical interests, so the platform's design around authentication, auditing, and data boundaries is critical.74% similar
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