Unverified50% confidenceFactExact time
Hidden-information games are defined in game theory as extensive-form games with imperfect information, and theoretical equilibrium solution methods such as CFR (Counterfactual Regret Minimization) are practically infeasible to deploy at the scale of Stratego due to computational costs
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/5/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
UnverifiedCounterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) was proposed by Zinkevich et al. in 2007 and was originally used to solve Nash equilibria in large-scale imperfect information games.68% similarUnverified游戏引擎的安全加固往往需要对原有代码库进行深度重构，是此类跨界项目最容易被低估的技术成本63% similarUnverifiedVulnerability mining is essentially a probability game; the more time and coverage invested, the greater the output, and failing to find vulnerabilities is often due to insufficient scope, information gathering, and analysis.63% similar
Cite This Claim
Stable URI
https://kongchang.com/claim/976413API
curl https://kongchang.com/api/v1/knowledge/claims/976413MCP
get_claim(id=976413)