Unverified50% confidenceSolutionExact time
This fix blocks symlink attack paths by performing canonical path validation at read time and rejecting links that ultimately point outside the working directory.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/6/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
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