Unverified50% confidenceDecision RuleExact time
The policy approach does not detect the injection; it denies the subsequent actions because reading credentials and making outbound calls were never within the agent's permitted scope in the first place (default-deny).
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/11/2026
First Seen
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
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