Certificate Transparency Log
A public audit log system for SSL/TLS certificates that records the domain information of all deployed certificates. It can be used to discover newly launched subdomains and to assess the exposure surface of a service.
Core Facts
Timeline (last 90 days)
By searching a domain's records in CT logs, one can obtain all certificates ever issued for that domain, associated subdomains, issuance times and CA information, and can even discover subdomains that have not yet been made public.
Systematic approaches to investigating unfamiliar domains include: checking DNS resolution records, looking at certificate issuance information, searching public threat intelligence databases, and searching the community for whether anyone has discussed the same string.
The harm of weak keys is systemic: unlike a vulnerability on a single site, it undermines the trust premise of all connections relying on that CA, so certificate transparency logs, key strength audits, and rapid revocation mechanisms are needed together as a backstop.
Certificate Transparency (CT) logs require CAs to publish every certificate they issue, so if attackers issue certificates, in theory a public record will be left behind.
Certificate Transparency logs, internet scanning projects (such as Censys and Rapid7's historical datasets), and security research community archives make historical certificates searchable.
All Facts (5)
Certificate Transparency (CT) logs require CAs to publish every certificate they issue, so if attackers issue certificates, in theory a public record will be left behind.
65%UnverifiedBy searching a domain's records in CT logs, one can obtain all certificates ever issued for that domain, associated subdomains, issuance times and CA information, and can even discover subdomains that have not yet been made public.
50%UnverifiedSystematic approaches to investigating unfamiliar domains include: checking DNS resolution records, looking at certificate issuance information, searching public threat intelligence databases, and searching the community for whether anyone has discussed the same string.
50%UnverifiedThe harm of weak keys is systemic: unlike a vulnerability on a single site, it undermines the trust premise of all connections relying on that CA, so certificate transparency logs, key strength audits, and rapid revocation mechanisms are needed together as a backstop.
50%UnverifiedCertificate Transparency logs, internet scanning projects (such as Censys and Rapid7's historical datasets), and security research community archives make historical certificates searchable.
50%