Unverified50% confidenceOpinionExact time
Alternative AI control proposals discussed in arms control circles mostly focus on compute threshold declarations, notification of training runs, chip export controls and post-deployment behavioral evaluation, but these mechanisms verify inputs and behavior rather than capability itself, leaving considerable room for circumvention.
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50%
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Long-term
Relevance
11/5/2026
First Seen
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