Unverified50% confidenceFactExact time
Ollama once fixed a DNS rebinding vulnerability, but subsequent research pointed out that the same kind of problem still exists, and that as long as the bind address is not loopback, it skips validation of the requested hostname.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Medium-term (~90 days)
Relevance
11/9/2026
First Seen
Valid until: 2/7/2027
Sources
Related Entities
Related Claims
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