End-to-End Verifiability
A security property of electronic voting systems requiring that the election process be independently verifiable at three levels: ballot casting, ballot recording, and tallying, while not revealing the contents of votes.
Timeline (last 90 days)
End-to-end verifiability (E2E-V) requires that the election process be independently verifiable at three levels: cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast, and tallied-as-recorded.
Achieving end-to-end verifiability usually requires cryptographic techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs, mix-nets, or homomorphic encryption.
Estonia's i-Voting did not fully achieve end-to-end verifiability in its early versions, and relevant mechanisms were gradually introduced later.
Publishing only the source code without providing reproducible builds and a verification path greatly diminishes the significance of its transparency.
All Facts (4)
End-to-end verifiability (E2E-V) requires that the election process be independently verifiable at three levels: cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast, and tallied-as-recorded.
50%UnverifiedAchieving end-to-end verifiability usually requires cryptographic techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs, mix-nets, or homomorphic encryption.
50%UnverifiedEstonia's i-Voting did not fully achieve end-to-end verifiability in its early versions, and relevant mechanisms were gradually introduced later.
50%UnverifiedPublishing only the source code without providing reproducible builds and a verification path greatly diminishes the significance of its transparency.
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